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Abstract 25 
The Coronavirus Disease 19 epidemic is an infectious disease which was declared as a pandemic and 26 
hit all the Countries, all over the world, from the beginning of the year 2020. 27 
Despite the emergency vigilance plans, in all the Countries, Health Systems experienced a different 28 
ratio of lethality, admissions to intensive care units  and managing quarantine of positive patients. 29 
The aim of this study is to investigate if some health indicators might have been useful to understand 30 
the capacity of Italian National Health Service to manage the COVID 19 epidemic. 31 
We will compare data in two different Italian regions in the Northern part of Italy (Lombardy and 32 
Veneto) with the national data to understand if different health strategies might be significant to 33 
explain different patterns of COVID 19 epidemic in Italy. 34 
The two regions have two different health policies to face CoViD-2019 epidemic. 35 
To face epidemic like this one the answer should be outside hospitals but this means to have general 36 
practitioners well-trained and enough healthcare personnel working outside hospitals. 37 
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Introduction 43 
Planning health services (HSs) is complex. It requires a rigorous, evidence-based approach to 44 
improving high quality services to meet the future health needs of the population (1). 45 
This goal should be achieved through the provision of efficient and effective HS, considering 46 
available resources and balancing hospital and local services (2). 47 
Health planning should be future oriented and able to support organizations, to be better prepared to 48 
address emerging health threats and, for this reason, it needs to develop emergency plans to assure 49 
operational readiness to respond to emergencies (2).  50 
Public health is constantly threatened by a wide range of hazards. Despite measures to prevent them, 51 
emergencies of varying types, scales and consequences still occur and must find HS ready to manage 52 
them. 53 
The Coronavirus Disease 19 (COVID 19) epidemic is an infectious disease which was declared as a 54 
pandemic and hit all the Countries, all over the world, from the beginning of the year 2020 (3). 55 
Despite the emergency vigilance plans, in all the Countries, HSs experienced a different ratio of 56 
lethality, admissions to intensive care units (ICUs), and managing quarantine of positive patients 57 
(3,4). 58 
We might evaluate these differences as a proxy of distinct management decisions at both national and 59 
local level, because health data related to COVID-19 infection might change with its different 60 
healthcare management strategies, for example: 61 
- Observed lethality ratio might change in relation of the number of the swabs performed (only 62 
with the application of the swabs we can be sure about the positive cases and the correct 63 
diagnosis).  64 
- Some health authorities decided treating COVID-19 positive patients at home and some 65 
others in hospital. We should indeed consider that to treat COVID-19 positive patients in 66 
hospital might expose healthcare workers to the infection, moreover quarantine or home 67 
isolation of a-/pauci-symptomatic patients could leave hospital beds free for more severe 68 
cases (5). 69 
The aim of this study is to investigate if the health indicators took into consideration might be useful 70 
to understand the capacity of Italian HS to manage the COVID 19 epidemic. 71 
We will compare data in two different Italian regions in the Northern part of Italy (Lombardy and 72 
Veneto) with the national data to understand if different HS strategies might be significant to explain 73 
different patterns of COVID 19 epidemic in Italy. 74 
The considered indicators are not good to plan preventive measures, but they are quite good measures 75 
to estimate the burden of the disease in this pandemic situation.  76 
 77 
Materials and Methods 78 
Data about the spread of the coronavirus in Italy were provided by “Dipartimento della Protezione 79 
Civile – Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri” (http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/it); in particular 80 
the following information were update daily at 18:30 (after the Head of Department press 81 
conference): national situation, regional situation and provinces situation. 82 
We obtained the data from the site of GitHub in which there is a repository of the data of 83 
“Dipartimento della Protezione Civile” (https://github.com/pcm-dpc/COVID-19). 84 
For this work we took into consideration national data from 24/02/2020 to 12/04/2020 (so 49 days in 85 
total) and in particular those variables: 86 
- deaths 87 
- symptomatic hospitalized patients 88 
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- patients in ICUs 89 
- currently infected patients 90 
- total cases (currently positive patients, healed patients and deaths) 91 
- patients in quarantine 92 
- discharged or healed patients 93 
For a particular day those variables are presented as a cumulate of the values of previous days. 94 
We tried to model the dynamic evolution change of those indicators during the considered period:  95 
- The ratio between discharged or healed patients and total cases  96 
- Case fatality ratio (“observed lethality”) 97 
- The ratio between currently infected patients and total cases  98 
- The ratio between ICU patients and currently infected patients  99 
- The ratio between quarantined patients and currently infected patients  100 
- The ratio between symptomatic hospitalized patients and currently infected patients  101 
For each day, data were available in form of aggregated daily counts  and only the numerator and 102 
denominator to calculate the endpoints of interest for each analysis were used. 103 
A logistic regression model was used where the response variable was the proportion of subjects with 104 
the endpoint above reported and the independent variable was the time starting from 24/02/2020 105 
(beginning of the spread of the coronavirus) and the day of 12/04/2020. 106 
In the model, the denominator used to calculate the outcome of interest was added to the model as 107 
weight; for example, for the ratio between discharged/healed patients and total cases, the 108 
denominator was the number of total cases.  109 
The shape of the time trend was modelled including restricted cubic spline functions.  110 
Our aim was simply to obtain a smoothed shape of the trends, so we avoid to define knots positions. 111 
Knots were placed according to a standard procedure, suggested by Harrell (6); in particular given 112 
the linearity constraint, the first knot is placed at 0.025 quantile and the last at 0.975 quantile of the 113 
time distribution. In fact, restricted cubic splines, depend on the number of knots but are robust to the 114 
exact knots position. 115 
Separate models were performed for Italy, Lombardy and Veneto for each indicator. 116 
In order to choose the final model representing the smoothed shape of the trends the following 117 
procedure was applied:  118 
1) Models with spline from 3 to 10 knots were performed, because we decided to have a 119 
maximum of one knot every five days. 120 
2) For each model AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) was reported and the estimated trend of 121 
the indicator over time was graphically examined in relationship to the observed data. 122 
3) Among all the models that one with the lower value of AIC was considered. 123 
The following splines were chosen for each index: 124 
- The ratio between discharged or healed patients and total cases: for Italy, Lombardy and 125 
Veneto we chose a spline with 10 knots. 126 
- Case fatality ratio (“observed lethality”): for Italy we chose a spline with 8 knots, for 127 
Lombardy we chose a spline with 10 knots, while for Veneto we chose a spline with 5 knots. 128 
- The ratio between currently infected patients and total cases: for Italy, Lombardy and Veneto 129 
we chose a spline with 10 knots.  130 
- The ratio between ICUs patients and currently infected patients: for Italy we chose a spline 131 
with 10 knots, for Lombardy we chose a spline with 7 knots and for Veneto we chose a spline 132 
with 9 knots. 133 
- The ratio between quarantined patients and currently infected patients: for Italy and for 134 
Lombardy we chose a spline with 10 knots, while for Veneto we chose a spline with 9 knots. 135 
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- The ratio between symptomatic hospitalized patients and currently infected patients: for Italy 136 
and Lombardy we chose a spline with 10 knots, while for Veneto we chose a spline with 8 137 
knots. 138 
As the estimated regression coefficients for the cubic splines terms are not directly interpretable, 139 
results are reported only by the graphical estimated trend. 140 
In some smoothed estimates, the goodness of fit for the first days (in general for the first 10 days) 141 
seems to be not satisfactory, but this is because of the low number of events in that period. 142 
 143 
Results 144 
Fig. 1 shows the ratio between discharged or healed patients and total cases. 145 
The trend of the Lombardy is over the trend of Italy and Veneto, but all the three trends show an 146 
increase during the time of our observation as it is expected in an epidemic. 147 
In Veneto  the trend is underlying that of Lombardy, because of the different strategies adopted by 148 
the regions: in Veneto we had less hospitalization (and so less discharged patients) because 149 
hospitalization was decided only for patients with critical condition; this strategy probably had a 150 
positive impact for the healed patients. 151 
 152 
Fig. 2 shows the case fatality ratio (“observed lethality”) 153 
The lethality was very high in Lombardy. This may be explained by the fact that epidemic started in 154 
this region for the intensive commercial traffic with China.  155 
The beginning of the epidemic was misunderstood probably because it happened during the influenza 156 
season.  157 
There are also other explanations for this: 158 
- With a very high number of admissions in hospital it is possible that all the deaths occurred in 159 
hospital were considered caused by COVID 19 which it might have been only a comorbidity. 160 
- The high admission rate might be a measure of the inadequate answer for the cure of the 161 
disease outside hospitals. 162 
- The high lethality rate in Lombardy might be explained by the high number of deaths in old 163 
people guested in residential homes. 164 
- It might be a bias the low lethality rate in Veneto only because people died at home with no 165 
swab performed and no identification of the positive condition for COVID 19. 166 
We may distinguish between case fatality ratio (“observed lethality”) vs. infected fatality ratio (“true 167 
lethality”). 168 
One can argue that in Lombardy lethality “appears” so high because of the underestimation of the 169 
number of real total cases, due to the low number of swabs performed and the consequent 170 
underestimation of the denominator. It must be considered that also the numerator of the fraction is 171 
certainly underestimated, since many people died at home (or even in hospitals, at least at the 172 
beginning of epidemic) without a certain diagnosis.  173 
The red areas located in Bergamo and Brescia, which are in Lombardy, might have contributed to 174 
this high number of deaths. 175 
The rapid increase of the number of deaths put the Government to decide for some restriction 176 
measures which became the national lockdown on the 9th of March (7).  177 
Fig. 3 shows the ratio between currently infected patients and total cases  178 
The trends, as we expected, reflect the performance of an epidemic: the number of positive falls 179 
because patients recover and thank to the lockdown measure. The numbers of Veneto are higher only 180 
because it performed much more swabs.  181 
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Fig. 4 shows the ratio between ICUs patients and currently infected patients  182 
The intensive use of hospital beds is evident in the figure for Lombardy while in Veneto the use of 183 
ICUs is postponed of some days and devoted only to the more severe patients. Lombardy faced the 184 
highest number of cases at the beginning of the epidemic when the way to cure these patients was not 185 
assessed and the intensive care would have been the best therapeutic option.  186 
Fig. 5 shows the ratio between quarantined patients and currently infected patients 187 
The trend shows the strategy of care for this epidemic in Veneto whose government decided to bring 188 
to hospitals just the more severe patients, while treating the other ones at home. 189 
So, we have two different regional strategies: the stable trend of Veneto is the result of the territorial 190 
care and the lower proportion of the Lombardy is the result of the hospital-centered care in this 191 
region (the initial fall followed by an increase is the result of the saturation of bed in hospital, 192 
particularly in ICUs). 193 
Fig. 6 shows the ratio between symptomatic hospitalized patients and the total number of cases 194 
currently infected patients  195 
This figure shows how in Lombardy the only strategy played for positive patients was the admission 196 
to hospital. The Veneto strategy seems to be more stable during all the period of observation. 197 
However, the excess of positive cases related to early diagnosis can only partly explain the difference 198 
in apparent lethality due to the presence of silent cases without Covid-19 disease manifestation after 199 
massive screening practice in Veneto with respect to the symptomatic confirmation approach adopted 200 
in Lombardy. It is well known that this paradoxical effect is partly compensated by the increase of 201 
the lethality ratio in time even for the best regions. However, this phenomenon was observed also to 202 
the same extent for both Lombardy and Veneto. Better indicators should be therefore the ratio 203 
between the deaths and people hospitalized. In a region with lower degree of hospitalization we could 204 
expect that more serious cases are hospitalized therefore we could expect a higher ratio between the 205 
total number of deaths and the total number of hospitalized patients. This index should be at least 206 
comparable between the regions even in situations with different numbers of silent asymptomatic 207 
cases if similar admission criteria were adopted according to the similar expression of Covid-19 208 
disease. If Veneto was expecting to admit more serious cases mostly relying for the rest on home 209 
management such an index was expected to be higher than Lombardy. However, the approximated 210 
index was 0.554 for Veneto and 0.737 for Lombardy (since the lack of analytical epidemiological 211 
data, the total number of hospitalized is only approximated by the sum of the presently hospitalized 212 
patients with the fraction of the total dismissed/healed proportional to the number of the hospitalized 213 
patients themselves). This result is supporting the fact that not only the apparent but also the true 214 
lethality could be also different between the two regions according to the different impact of Covid-215 
19 on the local HS.        216 
This evidence is also supported by the general mortality data and in particular to the relative 217 
mortality estimation looking at two reference cities of Lombardy: Milano and Brescia which were 218 
showing a huge increment in the expected mortality at 1.96 and 3.15 times with 1369 and 391 excess 219 
deaths, respectively, compared to Venezia and Verona at 1.16 and 1.33 times with 62 and 87 excess 220 
deaths, respectively attributable as directed and indirected causes to Covid-19 (8). 221 
 222 
Discussion 223 
Looking at all these data it is possible to argue that the HS in Lombardy seems less prepared to cope 224 
with this epidemic while the Veneto HS managed quite well the patients and their disease. 225 
These two regions represent the Italian situation where many different health organizations coexist: 226 
in Lombardy there was a progressive removal of public services in favor of private ones and there 227 
was the gradual dismantling of “territorial-centered” services and interventions (for example GPs, 228 
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Local Social and Health Agencies) versus “hospital-centered” ones (for example the Emergency 229 
Departments); in Veneto we had a “territory-centered” system (9). 230 
These features are reflected in the different health policies adopted by the two local governances to 231 
face CoViD-2019 epidemic. 232 
In all the figures (except for a short trait in the ICUs pts. vs. currently infected pts. ratio curve), the 233 
national curve (which obviously is the result of a weighted average of all regional ones) lays between 234 
the two curves of Lombardy and Veneto, which are two “opposite poles” in the Italian landscape. 235 
Indeed, while we can consider the last one as a positive coping region. In particular, in 2009, in 236 
Lombardy, the Regional Management Board asked to limit the use of hospitals only to the more 237 
severe cases (10,11). 238 
To face epidemic like this one the answer should be outside hospitals but this means to have general 239 
practitioners able to perform swabs and provided with PPEs, and in general well-trained healthcare 240 
personnel working outside hospitals (12). 241 
This is not the Italian situation in fact the Global Health Security Index 2019 gave to Italy a very low 242 
score for emergency preparedness and response planning and risk communication: Italy was 31st on 243 
195 Countries: Italy must start from this point (13, 14). 244 
 245 
 246 
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Fig. 1. Ratio between discharged or healed patients and total cases. 291 
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Fig. 2.  Case fatality ratio (“observed lethality”) 308 
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Fig. 3. Ratio between currently infected patients and total cases  311 
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Fig. 4. Ratio between ICUs patients and currently infected patients  319 
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Fig. 5. Ratio between quarantined patients and currently infected patients 321 
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Fig. 6. Ratio between symptomatic hospitalized patients and the total number of cases curren332 
infected patients  333 
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